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2
U.S. Employment and Training
Programs and Performance





Prior to the recession that began in 2007, public expenditures on 
employment and training services were declining. For example, in fi s-
cal year 2007, the total U.S. federal government appropriations for WIA 
programs—youth employment, adult job training, dislocated worker 
assistance, Job Corps, and other national activities—was $4.4 billion, 
down 18 percent from fi scal year 2005. Within the WIA program, the 
number of adults receiving training was likewise declining appreciably 
relative to its predecessor, JTPA (Frank and Minoff 2005). Further-
more, the JTPA program had substantially reduced the size and scope 
of federal public employment and training programs relative to its pre-
decessors, the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) and 
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA).
In 2009, the Obama administration reversed these trends of dimin-
ishing public expenditures on employment and training. The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) injected an unprecedented 
level of funding (an addition of more than $3.5 billion) into the pub-
lic workforce development system and associated employment and 
training programs.1 This infusion of resources to aid unemployed and 
underemployed workers nearly doubled U.S. federal government fund-
ing for WIA programs and rejuvenated public interest in improving the 
effectiveness of the workforce development system.
This book focuses on the two most recent workforce development 
programs, JTPA and WIA. JTPA is widely known for having intro-
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duced outcomes-based performance standards to public employment 
and training programs (in 1982). WIA has retained the basic structure 
of its predecessor while making important operational changes in the 
performance standards system (in 2000).2 This chapter aims to provide 
basic information about U.S. employment and training programs to aid 
our readers in understanding the research and analyses presented in this 
book. In the following sections, essential features of these programs are 
described, including their origins and organizational structures, eligibil-
ity rules and the types of services made available to participants, and the 
design of the performance standards systems.
ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
OF JTPA AND WIA 
During the period in which it operated, JTPA constituted the larg-
est federal employment and training program for disadvantaged U.S. 
workers. The act mandated the provision of employment and train-
ing services to “those who can benefi t from, and are most in need of, 
such opportunities.” It also required that the basic return on training 
investments “be measured by the increased employment and earnings 
of participants and the reduction in welfare dependency” (U.S. Con-
gress 1982). Designed in the Reagan era of New Federalism, JTPA 
was distinguished by a more decentralized administrative structure that 
included a larger role for the private sector; a performance standards 
system developed to measure program outcomes, increase local-level 
accountability, and encourage more effi cient program management; and 
lower program costs per participant, in part due to elimination of public 
service employment and participant stipend components. Dickinson et 
al. (1988), LaLonde (1995), and O’Leary, Straits, and Wandner (2004) 
provide more detail on the history of employment and training pro-
grams in the United States.
The original titles of the JTPA legislation established four differ-
ent programs.3 Title IIA authorized the largest of these programs to 
serve economically disadvantaged youths and adults, accounting for 
the majority of JTPA client enrollments and training expenditures.4 The 
primary services provided under JTPA Title IIA—vocational training, 
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on-the-job training, basic/remedial education, job search assistance, 
work experience, and other services such as counseling and assess-
ment, job-readiness activities, and case management—continue to be 
available in WIA, although training priorities and service access have 
changed. While amendments to JTPA had shifted service provision 
away from low-cost job search activities and toward more intensive 
(e.g., classroom) training, WIA made important changes to refocus 
the program toward assessment and job search assistance services that 
are made available to a broader population. WIA, enacted in 1998, of-
fi cially superseded the JTPA program in July 2000. See O’Shea and 
King (2001) for a comprehensive discussion of the WIA provisions and 
changes, Social Policy Research Associates (2004) for a comprehensive 
report on WIA implementation.
In both JTPA and WIA, responsibility for the interpretation and im-
plementation of program provisions was delegated to the USDOL. The 
USDOL communicates some specifi c policy directives to states, but the 
interpretation of many critical provisions and the major responsibility 
for program administration and service delivery lie with state and local 
job training agencies. Under JTPA, the distinct (nonoverlapping and ex-
haustive) program jurisdictions were known as service delivery areas; 
in WIA, they are called workforce investment areas. 
Federal funding for these programs is allocated to states in propor-
tion to measures of economic need, e.g., the number of unemployed 
and economically disadvantaged individuals residing within them.5 
And although states are required to expend the recent federal stimulus 
funding by the end of June 2011, the Obama administration encouraged 
them to spend the funds in “transformational efforts” to realize the “full 
capacity” of the system to innovate and improve the effectiveness of 
workforce development programs (USDOL 2009a).
The organizational forms of the job training centers and their ap-
proaches to service delivery have varied across states and localities 
under both JTPA and WIA.6 Some job training centers are public enti-
ties at the state, county, or municipal government level, and others are 
private, not-for-profi t, or for-profi t organizations. Under WIA, states 
are required to establish a State Workforce Investment Board, includ-
ing the governor, members of the state legislature, and representatives 
of business, labor, educational entities, economic development agen-
cies, and community-based organizations. A major responsibility of the 
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board is to develop a state plan that outlines a fi ve-year strategy for 
the statewide workforce investment system. At the local level, all job 
training centers are directed and supervised by a board of representa-
tives from business, labor, the community, and local elected offi cials, 
known formerly as Private Industry Councils under JTPA and currently 
as Workforce Investment Boards under WIA. These boards determine 
who is served, the types of services made available, and who should 
provide the services (within the limitations of the statute). 
The particular structure of local program administration depends 
on a number of factors, including the size of the job training juris-
diction and its population, urban versus rural location, local political 
confi gurations, and state-level administrative policies. In the JTPA 
program, some agencies provided training services directly to eligible 
clients, while a majority contracted with independent service provider 
organizations to select participants and deliver program services (see 
Dickinson et al. 1988). Workforce Investment Boards in the current 
program are required to operate at least one One-Stop Career Center 
in their service area, with the objective of colocating programs of the 
USDOL, Department of Education, Department of Health and Human 
Services, and Department of Housing and Urban Development (e.g., 
employment services, unemployment insurance, vocational rehabilita-
tion, adult education, welfare-to-work, and postsecondary vocational 
education). The local boards develop and enter into a “memorandum of 
understanding” with the One-Stop partners that specifi es the services to 
be provided through the One-Stop delivery system, how the service and 
operating costs of the system will be funded, and methods for referral of 
customers between the One-Stop operator and the partners. 
WIA also uses a form of vouchers for some participants, called 
individual training accounts (ITAs), which allows them to purchase 
training services directly from certifi ed providers, a provision intended 
to increase “customer choice” over the JTPA approach of using subcon-
tracted providers. Implementation of ITAs varies on several dimensions, 
including how the amount of the ITAs (or customers’ spending) is 
determined, whether counseling in the use of the ITAs is required or 
voluntary, and how much local staff restrict customers’ training choices. 
D’Amico and Salzman (2004), Decker and Perez-Johnson (2004), and 
McConnell et al. (2006) provide more detail on ITAs and also describe 
an experimental evaluation of alternative ITA implementations.
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The research presented in the subsequent chapters of this book 
conveys how critical these structures and processes are (as well as the 
allocation of authority and discretion within them) in determining ser-
vice access and program effectiveness. 
PROGRAM ELIGIBILITY AND SERVICES
Although JTPA and WIA differ considerably in their eligibility crite-
ria, they have in common the voluntary nature of program participation. 
The JTPA Title IIA program was more narrowly focused on serving the 
disadvantaged, requiring 90 percent of all enrollees to be disadvantaged 
and minimum levels of service to particular segments of the popula-
tion, including youths, high school dropouts, and welfare recipients.7 
At the same time, Devine and Heckman (1996) show that the federal 
eligibility rules defi ned a fairly broad JTPA-eligible population, and lo-
cal job training centers retained discretion to enroll noneconomically 
disadvantaged persons who satisfi ed other “hardship” criteria defi ned 
in the act (e.g., displaced homemakers, persons with limited English 
profi ciency, etc.) for the other 10 percent of their participant popula-
tions. Because annual program funding levels afforded services to less 
than 3 percent of the JTPA-eligible population (Heckman and Smith 
1999), state and local administrative entities had considerable leeway in 
identifying specifi c target groups and developing additional participant 
selection criteria within the eligibility guidelines (i.e., being eligible did 
not guarantee one the opportunity to participate).  
Under WIA, the most basic “core” services—outreach, intake/
assessment, job search assistance/placement, and labor market infor-
mation—are made available to the general public with no qualifying 
criteria/eligibility requirements. The USDOL does not require monitor-
ing and tracking of participants using the self-directed core services or 
non-WIA services at the One-Stop centers, but rather only those par-
ticipants who receive substantial staff assistance in the WIA programs. 
Individuals’ access to intensive or training services (e.g., comprehensive 
assessment and case management, vocational, or on-the-job training) 
proceeds sequentially if they are “unemployed and are unable to obtain 
employment through core services provided” (WIA, Section 134 3.A.i). 
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However, as Eberts, O’Leary, and DeRango (2002) note, the USDOL 
offers little guidance to One-Stop center workers on how to identify the 
needs of this broader target population and how to refer customers to 
the various levels of service in a cost-effective manner. Wandner (2002) 
nicely summarizes the differences in JTPA and WIA “service referral 
principles,” and argues that there is a greater need for the use of target-
ing tools under WIA to aid frontline staff in determining appropriate 
service levels for customers.
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS SYSTEM DESIGN
Under both JTPA and WIA, the performance standards system is 
designed to reward job training centers or state workforce development 
programs, respectively, that achieve performance goals with incentive 
(budgetary) awards and external recognition. The USDOL, state job 
training agencies, and local job training centers have together defi ned 
and enforced these incentive policies. 
The federal government is primarily involved in defi ning the basic 
structure of the performance standards system in public employment 
and training programs. These responsibilities of the USDOL include 
defi ning mandatory performance measures to be used by states and lo-
cal areas, setting state accounting and reporting rules, and monitoring, 
rewarding, and/or sanctioning job training center performance. Table 
2.1 shows the performance measures currently in effect under WIA and 
also indicates which of these are new to WIA (i.e., were not used in 
JTPA). Though the majority of these measures are common to JTPA 
and WIA, there were a number of changes made in JTPA that shifted the 
focal point of performance measurement from enrollees’ labor market 
status at the time of program completion to three months after termi-
nation from the program. Under WIA, the follow-up period has been 
extended to six months after program completion. Chapter 4 includes 
additional discussion of the evolution of the performance measures un-
der JTPA.
States are also now required to calculate performance outcomes us-
ing Unemployment Insurance (UI) data. An earlier GAO report (2002) 
indicated that some states were experiencing diffi culties in getting 
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access to these records and developing or modifying data systems to 
produce this information. The USDOL has since been working to pro-
mote data exchange between states via the Wage Record Interchange 
System (WRIS), which specifi cally facilitates the exchange of wage 
data for the purpose of assessing and reporting on state and local em-
ployment and training program and provider performance. As of August 
2009, all states were participating in the WRIS.8  
Performance standards are the numerical goals that job training 
centers must achieve to become eligible for incentive awards and to 
avoid sanctions. In JTPA, the USDOL exercised greater authority in 
the determination of performance standard levels (or targets). It estab-
lished expected performance levels in JTPA using a regression-based 
model with national departure points. States could use the optional 
Labor Department adjustment model or develop their own adjustment 
procedures, although state-developed procedures and adjustments had 
to conform to the department’s parameters (Social Policy Research 
Associates 1999). A majority of states adopted the optional USDOL ad-
justment model and used the USDOL-provided performance standards 
worksheets to determine performance targets, although sometimes with 
modifi cations. Chapters 4 and 5 present additional information about 
how performance standards were adjusted under the JTPA program.
Under WIA, states negotiate with the USDOL and local service de-
livery areas to establish performance targets, using estimates based on 
historical data that are similarly intended to take into account differ-
ences in economic conditions, participant characteristics, and services 
delivered. Since performance data were collected in JTPA, more than 
half of the states used these baseline data to determine appropriate levels 
for the WIA-negotiated performance standards or to inform negotia-
tions with local workforce development offi cials. The informal process 
of making these adjustments during negotiations in WIA contrasts no-
ticeably with the standardized regression-based approach used by states 
under JTPA. States’ own reports of procedures used to determine WIA 
performance standards suggest that there is substantially greater discre-
tion and variation in both the processes and types of information used 
to establish the state-level standards (Heinrich 2004). The pretext for 
making this change to a system of negotiated standards was to promote 
“shared accountability,” described as one of the “guiding principles” of 
WIA (USDOL 2001, p. 8).9
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Table 2.1  Performance Measures—JTPA and WIA
Performance measure Description 
Adults
Entered employment rate The percentage of adults who obtained a job by the end of the fi rst quarter after program 
exit (excluding participants employed at registration).
Employment retention rate at 6 months Of adults who had a job in the fi rst quarter after exit, percentage with a job in the third 
quarter after exit.
Average earnings change in 6 months Of those who had a job in the fi rst quarter after exit, the postprogram earnings increases 
relative to preprogram earnings.
Employment and credential ratea Of those adults who received WIA training services, the percentage who were employed in 
the fi rst quarter after exit and received a credential by the end of the third quarter after exit.
Dislocated workers
Entered employment rate The percentage of dislocated workers who obtained a job by the end of the fi rst quarter 
after program exit (excluding those employed at registration).
Employment retention rate at 6 months Of those who had a job in the fi rst quarter after exit, the percentage of dislocated workers 
who have a job in the third quarter after exit.
Earnings replacement rate in 6 months Of those who had a job in the fi rst quarter after exit, the percentage of preprogram earnings 
that are earned postprogram.
Employment and credential ratea Of those dislocated workers who received WIA training services, the percentage who were 
employed in the fi rst quarter after exit and received a credential by the end of the third 
quarter after exit.
Older youths (19–21)
Entered employment rate The percentage of older youths who were not enrolled in postsecondary education or 
advanced training in the fi rst quarter after program exit and obtained a job by the end of 
the fi rst quarter after exit (excluding those employed at registration).
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Employment retention rate at 6 months Of those who had a job in the fi rst quarter after exit and were not enrolled in postsecondary 
education or advanced training in the third quarter after program exit, the percentage of 
older youths who have a job in the third quarter after exit.
Average earnings change in 6 months Of those who had a job in the fi rst quarter after exit and were not enrolled in postsecondary 
education or advanced training, the postprogram earnings increases relative to preprogram 
earnings.
Older youths employment/education/
training and credential ratea
The percentage of older youths who are in employment, postsecondary education, or 
advanced training in the fi rst quarter after exit and received a credential by the end of the 
third quarter after exit.
Younger youths
Retention rate In employment, postsecondary education, advanced training, apprenticeships in third 
quarter after exit.
Skill attainment rate Attain at least two goals relating to basic skills, work readiness, skill attainment, entered 
employment and skill training.
Diploma rate Earn a secondary school diploma or its recognized equivalent (GED).
Customer satisfaction
Participant satisfactiona The average of three statewide survey questions, rated 1 to 10 (1 = very dissatisfi ed to 10 = 
very satisfi ed), asking if participants were satisfi ed with services, if services met customer 
expectations, and how the services compared to the “ideal set” of services.
Employer satisfactiona The average of three statewide survey questions, rated 1 to 10 (1 = very dissatisfi ed to 10 = 
very satisfi ed), asking if employers were satisfi ed with services, if services met customer 
expectations, and how the services compared to the “ideal set” of services.
aNew to WIA.
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In JTPA, 6 percent of the federal government’s JTPA appropriation 
to states was designated for performance incentive awards to local job 
training centers. Some states made the incentive awards for job train-
ing centers dependent on their performance relative to other service 
delivery areas. Other states defi ned a maximum incentive payment for 
each job training center, with the fraction awarded depending on the 
difference between the center’s measured performance and the state 
standards. Until recently in the WIA program, the Secretary of Labor 
awarded incentive grants to states that achieve at least 80 percent of 
their negotiated performance levels on each performance measure and 
at least a 100 percent cumulative program area score for each of the 
program areas (adults, dislocated workers, and youths) and the cus-
tomer satisfaction measures.10 States were required to apply for the 
incentive grants and may receive a minimum grant award of $750,000, 
up to a maximum amount of $3,000,000 (conditional on the availabil-
ity of funds), for use in innovative programs. States that did not meet 
their performance goals for two consecutive years may be sanctioned 
with a 5 percent reduction in their WIA grants. In addition to the mon-
etary incentives and penalties under JTPA and WIA, states have also 
recognized high performers and innovative programs with special non-
monetary awards. In general, the performance standards system serves 
as the primary means for federal- and state-level monitoring and moti-
vation of local job training center operations and performance. 
SUMMARY
The goal of this chapter is to provide the basic information es-
sential to understanding the more in-depth and rigorous analyses of 
the performance standards systems in U.S. employment and training 
programs that follow in this book. The subsequent chapters delve into 
the complexities and challenges of operating an effi cient, informative, 
and accurate performance standards system, and the implications of 
basic program design elements—i.e., legislative objectives, organiza-
tional structures, accountability requirements, reporting relationships, 
and funding—for the effective functioning of a performance standards 
system. And importantly, the research presented in this book also ad-
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dresses the implications of these systems for the programs’ outcomes 
and impacts on participants’ employment and earnings. The majority of 
the following chapters focus primarily on JTPA, in part because it was 
the longest running public sector employment and training program in 
the United States and has had the longest history of any public sec-
tor program with an outcomes-based performance standard system; in 
part because of the unique data available from the experimental evalu-
ation of the JTPA program; and in part because it is similar enough 
to yield important lessons for current WIA programs and their future 
adaptations.
Notes
1. “Agency Reported Data,” Recovery.gov, accessed February 22, 2010, http://www
.recovery.gov/Transparency/agency/reporting/agency_reporting3.aspx?agency_
code=16&dt=02/12/2010.
2. According to Franklin and Ripley (1984, pp. 176–177), performance standards 
were under development for JTPA’s predecessor, CETA, but were not implemented 
prior to CETA’s replacement by JTPA.
3. Title IIB authorized a summer youth program, Title III funded a program for dis-
located workers, and Title IV governed various federally administered programs. 
Title I of the act described JTPA’s administrative structures, and Title V contained 
amendments and miscellaneous provisions relating to the interaction between 
JTPA and other programs such as the former Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children.
4. In the early 1990s, Title IIA was split, and a new Title IIC was created specifi cally 
for economically disadvantaged youth, while IIA was reauthorized to serve adults 
only.
5. In both the JTPA and WIA programs, one-third of the funds received by states 
depends on the relative number of unemployed individuals in the state; another 
third depends on the relative excess number of unemployed individuals (over 4.5 
percent), and the fi nal third depends on the number of economically disadvantaged 
persons (as defi ned by the act).
6. The term job training center is used interchangeably with service delivery area and 
workforce investment area in this book.
7. Section 4.8 of JTPA specifi cally defi ned economic “disadvantage” and was the 
basis from which the program eligibility criteria were derived. An individual was 
eligible for JTPA services if 1) the person or another member of his or her family 
received cash public assistance; 2) the person’s family income did not exceed the 
higher of the poverty level, or 70 percent of the lower living standard level; 3) the 
person was a handicapped adult whose own income met these criteria even though 
his/her family income may not have; 4) the person was eligible for food stamps 
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sometime during the six months prior to applying to JTPA; or 5) the person (a 
youth applicant) was a foster child. 
8. “WRIS Membership, August 7, 2009,” accessed March 4, 2010, http://www.doleta
.gov/performance/pfdocs/WRIS_MAP_08_07_09.pdf.
9. The USDOL is currently testing regression models for the WIA performance 
standards with the goal of returning to a system of regression-based adjustments 
beginning in July 2011 (USDOL 2009b).
 10. For example, if a state negotiates a 70 percent adult entered employment rate 
standard and then achieves actual entered employment rate performance of 75 
percent, it will have a score of 107 percent for that measure. If it does less well 
on its adult employment retention rate, say, achieving 60 percent instead of the 62 
percent standard, its score of only 96.8 percent on this measure will be offset by 
its exceptional achievement on the entered employment rate measure (or possibly 
one of the other two adult measures as well). Among the four adult performance 
measures, the cumulative score must be 100 percent (determined “by simple or 
weighted averaging”). 
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